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The importance of the role of attention is widely recognized not only by psychologists but also 
among academics and managers involved in knowledge management. It has become the bot-
tleneck of the performance of white-collar workers. The previous studies of attention in the 
field of knowledge management primarily concerned with getting the attention of the indi-
viduals and/or groups. However, for the process of knowledge increase it is also important 
that we are able to pay attention – and there is no white-collar work without knowledge in-
crease. There are many factors influencing our attention. This paper examines the factors 
along the dimensions of cognition and motivation only; the environmental impacts (like noise) 
are not investigated. The role of love and the muse – the emotional involvement – is discussed 
in detail. The result of the paper is a descriptive model of attention, which is then simulated 
with Doctus knowledge-based system. The model presented here (both, the descriptive and the 
simulative ones) is offered to discussion aiming to gain expert validation and fine-tuning. 
 




Attention is probably the hottest topic of knowledge management today: “… within knowl-
edge management, attention management has become the most important success factor.” 
(Davenport & Völpel, 2001) The reason for it is simple: attention is identified as the bottle-
neck of the performance improvement of white-collar workers in knowledge management. 
Because of the importance of this issue we are willing to pay for it (or give something in ex-
change), and so some authors speak about attention economy. (e.g. Davenport & Beck, 2001) 
Most efforts to-day are concerned with modes of catching the attention, as matter of fact there 
is a whole industry around this – the advertisement industry. It is indeed of essential impor-
tance to find out how to make people willing to pay attention to something. This paper aims 
to address the next phase, i.e. to find the individual characteristics determining if people can 
pay attention or not once they are willing to do it. This investigation is done within the 
framework of knowledge increase but as the white-collar work usually involves constant 
knowledge increase this is no restriction.1 
 
The examination goes along two dimensions, cognition and motivation. To understand what 
attention is, this inquiry begins with examination of the nature of attention, so we should go 
back to the early psychological experiments in the area; this is done in the next section. After 
a basic inquiry to the nature of attention the cognitive aspect is discussed in detail in the sub-
sequent section starting from the model of flow experience (Csíkszentmihályi, 2002) to which 
Baracskai (1999) and Baracskai and Velencei (2004) applied the approach of cognitive psy-
chology. There are then two sections devoted to examine the motivational conditions of atten-
tion, starting from Maslow’s (1954) hierarchy of needs dedicating significant effort to inquire 
into the role of love and even that of the muse. After this analytical part of the inquiry comes 
a section of synthesis of the identified factors. It seems that the first and probably most obvi-
ous question about the nature of attention: does multitasking exist? – at least fifty years of ex-
perimental records suggest this. 
 
1
 The reason for this is explained in the section “The cognitive conditions of attention”. 
 Does multitasking exist? 
 
Cherry’s (1953) subjects were listening to two different messages from the left and right 
headset speaker and later they were asked questions about them. If they were told in advance 
which message would they be asked about, they were very good at answering those questions 
but had only some very general recollection of the other message (e.g. they usually did know 
if the speaker was female or male but not if the message was in English or other language). 
This and similar experiments suggest that the attention cannot be distributed. On the other 
hand we can drive and listen to music and also thinking of our next meeting at the same time; 
or we can see children doing their homework, talking on the phone and be writing an instant 
message to some friend simultaneously. So can attention be distributed or not? Is there some 
real multitasking or only fast switching between the processes? 
 
The question of distributed attention makes us revisit the inquiry about parallel knowledge 
representation introduced by Rummelhart and Norman (1988). We also know that the capac-
ity of short-term memory (STM) is Muller’s (1956) magic number 7±2.1 This paradoxical 
situation can be easily resolved by adopting the conception of Davenport and Beck (2001) 
about distinguishing between the front-of-mind and back-of-mind attention. We can say that 
there is always only one of our activities in our front-of-mind attention and possibly several 
others in our back-of-mind attention. The front-of-mind attention is exclusive, the back-of-
mind attention is parallel. Nevertheless the front-of mind attention seems to be somewhat 
weakened by the simultaneous processes occupying our back-of-mind attention except if all 
the processes in our attention are concerned with the same thing. E.g. thinking about how to 
continue this paper, typing it and looking over some background literature. In this case we 
have all our attention focused which Davenport and Beck (2001) compare to Csíkszentmi-
hályi’s flow experience. 
 
Cognitive conditions of attention 
 
The cognitive aspects of attention in this paper are examined using the conception of cogni-
tive schemata and the flow experience. 
 
In cognitive psychology knowledge is described by the number of cognitive schemata, origi-
nally introduced by Bartlett (1932). Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) defined the levels of knowl-
edge and Mér (1990) used the number of schemata to distinguish between these levels. The 
beginner level is characterized with few tens of schemata, the advanced with few hundred, the 
expert (also called candidate master) with few thousand and the (grand)master with few tens 
of thousands.2  
 
Csíkszentmihályi (2002) portrayed the flow experience as a state in which “Concentration is 
so intense that there is no attention left over to think about anything irrelevant, or to worry 
about problems.” The flow experience can be described as a harmony of skills and challenges 
in narrow flow channel between boredom and anxiety. (See Figure 1, left) In his own words: 
“People seem to concentrate the best when demands on them are a bit greater than usual, 
and they are able to give more than usual. If there is too little demand on them, people are 
bored. If there is too much for them to handle, they get anxious. Flow occurs in that delicate 
zone between boredom and anxiety.” (Goleman, 1986) There is an additional important point 
we can note in this comment: the demand should be a bit greater. This is the reason that this 
 
1
 There are some other models of STM (e.g. Baddeley, 1999) but all consider it to be limited and that 
is the only relevant aspect here. 
2
 Dreyfus and Dreyfus used different names for the levels; here Mér’s terminology is adopted. The 
amateur, having no schemata in the discipline is not included. 
investigation is restricted to knowledge increase. For the same reason Goleman (1996) sug-
gests a new model for education which would aim at flow experience; and Baracskai (1999) 





































































Figure 1: The flow experience. 
 
Baracskai and Velencei (2004) applied the cognitive psychology approach on Csíkszentmi-
hályi’s model, to express the relation of knowledge and expectations in terms of knowledge 
levels, i.e. number of cognitive schemata. (See Figure 1, right) 
 
One of the characteristics of the flow experience was described as paying very concentrated 
attention to what we are doing. Can we reverse this logic and ask what is needed to have such 
a focused attention? We can get parts of the answer from the previous discussion: Flow ex-
perience cannot occur without knowledge increase, i.e. the demand should be a bit greater 
than the knowledge. As lecturers we can also frequently experience that the best performance 
is often preceded by something like stage-fright in actors. This is nothing like anxiety but 
more like some state of excitement of doing something interesting,1 People in business life 
usually talk about it as a challenging job. 
 
The knowledge increase as described here actually makes the difference between the chal-
lenge and the anxiety in work. We can receive a new schema (new knowledge) from the same 
knowledge level as ours or one higher; if it is at least two levels higher we will experience 
anxiety, if it is lower we will be bored. Baracskai (1999) calls these to situations anti-
experiences. Here they are identified as the cognitive conditions of attention. 
 
Motivational conditions of attention 
 
Every discussion of motivation begins with Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Sometimes it is 
presented in five levels (physiological, security, belongingness, esteem, and self-realisation), 
sometimes in eight (Maslow, 1987) to include the need “to know and understand”, the “aes-
thetical” needs and the “transcendental” ones. 
 
To be faithful to the process of the investigation a private experience will be described here as 
this has given me the essential understanding of Maslow’s model. It happened years ago and 
remembering it made me realize that motivation has to be included into the model of atten-
tion. I was working on a new course-book with my mentor Zoltán Baracskai, a task that de-
lighted me. After a couple of days of this work I was distracted and produced almost no re-
sult. All the sudden, my mentor asked me how much money I needed. I was surprised. I really 
had some financial troubles but I never told him about. How did he know? He has lent me 
some £200, a sum that would certainly not get me out of any serious trouble but it was 
 
1
 This excitement shows some similarity to sexual excitement, as reported by numerous performance-
artists. 
enough. I continued my work enthusiastically and successfully. Later, when we were discuss-
ing this topic, he told me that it was simply according to Maslow. I did not want to believe: 
“but Spinoza had written so beautiful things and died of hunger, and there are numerous simi-
lar examples…” The answer surprised me: “Yes, but he did not write those beautiful things 
when he was hungry.” I was taught on the MBA course that Maslow was wrong and it was 
explained using Alderfer’s (1969) model. I had obviously believed. 
 
Alderfer (1969) distinguished three groups of needs, of existence, of relatedness and of 
growth. These were very similar to the needs described by Maslow; the difference is in their 
interrelations. Alderfer said that if one factor is suppressed for some reason, the other can in-
crease (a common example used in management courses is student with no security pursuing 
knowledge). Actually, Maslow had never said that a higher need would not appear before the 
lower was satisfied. On the contrary, he spoke of “hierarchy of prepotency” and the “degree 
of relative satisfaction”. In the first edition of his book he said explicitly: “In actual fact, most 
members of our society who are normal are partially satisfied in all their basic needs and 
partially unsatisfied in all basic needs at the same time.” He also admitted that the hierarchy 
is not rigid, the basic needs are not in strictly fixed order, e.g. in some people esteem seems to 
be more important than love. However, it is still not explained how a certain need is some-
times greater than other times. 
 
This last contradiction can be resolved if we realize that needs are what we perceive as needs; 
and it has sometimes little to do with impartial measures like water content of blood or its hy-
drogen-ion level (from Maslow’s original description). The same can be done more elegantly 
by applying Russell’s (1948) egocentric particulars: “The four fundamental words of this sort 
are «I», «this», «here» and «now».” Or as a colleague of mine told me a year ago when I 
moved to the UK: “In the UK you are considered poor if you do not have a dishwasher, a 
second car or three televisions.” What does this have to do with poverty?  
 
Once we see clearly what our needs mean we can move forward with their examination. For 
the purpose of knowledge increase it makes no sense to distinguish the physiological and the 
security needs, as both of these are the needs of biological level (or existential as Alderfer 
named them). Similarly, the belongingness and the esteem are the social level (Alderfer’s re-
latedness). Unlike the previous ones, the need to know and understand, the aesthetical needs 
and the self realization should remain separately as they are of particular importance for 
knowledge increase. The transcendental needs are not included into this discussion. 
 
Maslow (1954) originally suggested that the degree of satisfaction of a lower need will de-
termine the degree of emergence of a higher need. He described this phenomenon in the fol-
lowing way: “For instance, if I may assign arbitrary figures for the sake of illustration… if 
prepotent need A is satisfied only 10 percent, then need B may not be visible at all. However, 
as this need A becomes satisfied 25 percent, need B may emerge 5 percent, as need A be-
comes satisfied 75 percent, need B may emerge 50 percent, and so on.” As measuring is im-
possible in case of higher needs we should find some more convenient approach. In the fol-
lowing section grades for the social level are suggested to describe the emergence of remain-




Let this section begin again with a personal example. I read a book about a year ago, in 
which, on his pilgrimage to San Tiago, Coelho (1997) learned that there are three words for 
love in Greek: philos, eros and agape. A couple of weeks later I met a Swedish man on a con-
ference in Oxford, who has Greek wife; he confirmed it and added that in Swedish there is 
only one word for love, thus, for example, you cannot say to your children that you love them. 
 
Fromm (1957) investigated the role of love in our life. He explained that essentially love is a 
capability of person, not something that happens to him/her: “Love is not primarily a rela-
tionship to a specific person; it is an attitude, an orientation of character which determines 
the relatedness of a person to the world as a whole, not towards one «object» of love.” 
Fromm identifies five objects of love and five types of love accordingly: brotherly love, 
motherly love, erotic love, self-love and love of God. 
 
Brotherly love is philos. It is the most essential type of love; the other types of love do not ex-
ist without the brotherly love. It is our sense of responsibility and care, our curiosity to know 
other people, our respect towards others. Brotherly love is love between equals, which does 
not mean that we are the same but that we are one. Brotherly love also lacks exclusiveness. 
Thus self-love also belongs to philos. Self-love emerges from emotional maturity, we cannot 
love others without loving ourselves, as Fromm (1957) said: “There is no concept of man in 
which I myself am not included.” Actually self-love defines the brotherly love: “love thy 
neighbour as thyself”. Therefore philos is suggested as the first grade of needs on the social 
level. 
 
Eros or erotic love is much more than sexuality; sexuality belongs to physiological needs 
(Maslow, 1954). All kinds of love make us become one with other people but the total union 
is the erotic love. This is a total fusion with another person. But we are not capable of total 
fusion with all the other people, thus the erotic love is exclusive; it is a union with a single 
other person. The phenomenon of oneness and individuality that we can see on personal plain 
is repeated in erotic love – one loves all the people but loves someone in a special, individual 
way. Eros, like philos is love of equals. If in eros there is no philos it is only passion. There-
fore eros is considered as the second grade of social needs. 
 
If love governs us towards unity with other people, than agape, the love of God, governs us to 
embrace the whole nature, the whole universe. Coelho (1999) calls it “love that consumes”. 
He gives two examples where he says it can be observed in its purest form: one is a hermit, 
who leaves the world of people to be consumed by this love and united with everything; the 
other is the enthusiasm of a person doing… well, doing anything. This second is the same as 
the flow experience (Csíkszentmihályi, 2002). Thus, agape is the third grade of the social-
level needs. 
 
The motherly love is not included in this model. It seems to be somehow a mixture of the pre-
vious ones; it is unconditional as philos, exclusive as eros and non-equal as agape. On the 
other hand there is no recorded experience how the motherly love influences the knowledge 
increase apart from turning ones attention away from it. This could probably be a topic for a 
future investigation. 
 
Let’s have a detour here to examine how the inspiration works. Many artists and scientists re-
ported about their muses, who inspire them. What is a muse? It usually appears as a lover, so 
it should indicate the presence of eros. But the achievements associated with muses clearly 
point to agape. The muse is a metaphor of a lover, in whom eros and agape are united. It 
seems that agape can be reached in some other mode as well, although most creative people 
(mostly artists) are reporting about muses. 
 
How to merge the factors? 
 
The three grades of satisfying the social needs would work the following way: in case of phi-
los, the need to know and understand emerges; in case of eros aesthetic need also emerges; 
and in case of agape we pursue self-realization. Of course it is also possible that the social 
level is not satisfied at all, in which case the person could not pursue higher needs. At the 
same time we should also take into account the needs of the biological level and how it alters 
this train of thought. 
 If the biological level was simply described with satisfied-unsatisfied grades we could say 
that if the biological level is satisfied, the satisfaction at the social level determines the emer-
gence of higher needs as explained above; and if the biological level is not satisfied the satis-
faction at the social level will make no difference. This argument may seem crude but as the 
need to know and understand, the aesthetical needs and the self-actualization is on much 
higher level in the hierarchy than the biological needs, it actually does not contradict to 
Maslow’s (1954) original presentation. 
 
The fact that there are only two grades assigned to the biological level might appear to be a 
weak point to the cursory glance. The reason for this is that we work in the framework of 
knowledge increase where the biological level is in vast majority of the cases fairly satisfied, 
and thus, even a small deficiency of it appears as major dissatisfaction. The biological and the 
social level as explained here would be two separate but interrelated factors and the higher 
levels would be the grades of the outcome. 
 
Now, we should add the cognitive conditions to the previous two factors. Csíkszentmihályi’s 
(2002) original notions of anxiety, boredom and flow become obvious candidates as grades 
for the cognitive factor. There is only one thing that we should consider: we do not speak of 
flow experience but of the conditions for the flow experience. Thus it makes sense to avoid 
the use of term flow and use e.g. harmony instead. This harmony is between the existing 
knowledge and the expectations, which means that the expectations should be a bit higher 
than the existing knowledge. Csíkszentmihályi (2002) has already said this but working in the 
framework of knowledge increase we can also see the explanation. If one already has the 
knowledge fitting the expectations, no knowledge increase will happen and one will be bored. 
This explains the meaning of challenging job. It is obvious that the harmony is the highest 
grade but of the two, is boredom or anxiety worst? Probably the anxiety. If one is bored, one 
can occupy oneself with something else, switching back from time to time to the original pro-
cess; on contrary, being anxious makes one unable to pay any attention at all. Therefore the 
suggested order of grades is none, anxiety, boredom, harmony, and the factor could be called 
the cognitive needs. 
 
The need to know and understand, the aesthetical needs and the self-actualization are the 
grades of the outcome. To create grades that reflect the domain of the knowledge increase 
better we can borrow terminology from de Bono (1994) and call the attention at the level of 
need to know and understand it as “analytical” and the attention at the level of aesthetic needs 
as “design”; which terms were used by de Bono to describe different learning levels. If the 
two lower two grades of attention are described by de Bono’s notions, the logical highest 
grade would be the inspired learning and the inspired attention accordingly. 
 
 
Figure 2: Complex rules of attention. 
 
We can create logical rules between the grades of the factors; we need 24 elementary rules to 
connect all the values. On Figure 2 above the model is describe using seven complex rules be-
tween the grades of the factors.1 
 
The model as presented here is only weakly validated but so far it seems to fit the observa-
tions. The validation happened in the form of discussion with experts, who intended to find 
counter-examples, and when they have found any the model was fine-tuned, i.e. the rules 




This paper was an inquiry into the nature of attention, not asking the question how to make 
people willing to pay attention but what makes it possible when they are already willing. Two 
aspects of attention were found to be important, motivation and cognition; and these were 
elaborated into three factor named biological, social and cognitive needs. 
 
The reader of this paper has probably noticed that there are other factors that are omitted in 
this investigation. E.g. several impacts of the environment are possible and not examined like 
noise, temperature, etc. They are omitted as their impact can usually be ignored, when they 
are weak and attention is otherwise high; on other occasions, when they are very strong they 
interrupt the process of knowledge increase completely and the effect is obvious. The envi-
ronmental impacts are also so diverse that it is impossible to model them. 
 
The personal attitude towards the knowledge increase could be also included. This can be 
done by distinguishing between talented and non-talented people, and the presented model 
describes the attention of talented people only and the non-talented are not examined here. In 
any discipline we would like to work with talented people so it is debatable if there is a reason 
for modelling the attention of non-talented ones. 
 
The cognitive need itself can be further examined; actually we would need to consider three 
cognitive aspects, the number of schemata, the speed of changing the relations between the 
schemata and the number of meta-schemata; as suggested from an ongoing investigation (see 
next paragraph). This would probably be the next step of this research. 
 
This paper is a part of a wider investigation that concerns the modelling of knowledge in-
crease. Attention is one of the factors identified as significant for knowledge increase, the 
other two are learning capability and learning willingness. The three factors together deter-
mine the docility of a person. Constructing a higher-level model of learning ability for better 
understanding of knowledge increase is matter of further research to which the model of at-
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